We present the results of an experiment that (a) shows the usefulness of screening out drop-outs and (b) tests whether different methods of payment and reminder intervals affect charitable giving. Following a lab session, participants could make online donations to charity for a total duration of three months. Our procedure justifying the exclusion of drop-outs consists in requiring participants to collect payments in person flexibly and as known in advance and as highlighted to them later. Our interpretation is that participants who failed to collect their positive payments under these circumstances are likely not to satisfy dominance. If we restrict the sample to subjects who did not drop out, but not otherwise, reminders significantly increase the overall amount of charitable giving. We also find that weekly reminders are no more effective than monthly reminders in increasing charitable giving, and that, in our three months duration experiment, standing orders do not increase giving relative to one-off donations.
A “collusion puzzle” exists by which, even though increasing the number of firms reduces the ability to tacitly collude, and leads to a collapse in collusion in experimental markets with three or more firms, in natural markets there are such numbers of firms colluding successfully. We present an experiment showing that, if managers are deferential toward an authority, firms can induce more collusion by delegating production decisions to middle managers and providing suitable informal nudges. This holds not only with two but also with four firms. We are also able to distinguish compliance effects from coordination effects.
The Emission Trading Scheme for green house gases is a key too of European climate protection. Including the road transport sector might be a promising strategy to limit its CO2 emissions. This could be realized within a common market (trans-sectoral trading permitted) or separated markets (trans-sectoral trading not permitted). Starting from different assumptions on emission deduction objectives, the impact of both options is analysed using a quantitative model. Although an emission trading scheme is ecologically effective regardless of the trading model, it turns out that CO2 emissions and emission allowance prices differ strongly between both design options due to sector specific price elasticities of allowance demand.
Die aktuelle Klima- und Energiepolitik ist stets auf der Suche nach effektiven Maßnahmen und technischen Lösungsansätzen zum Klimaschutz. Nicht selten werden bei der Umsetzung dieser Lösungen aber zusätzliche Emissionen verursacht. Durch die Analyse von Kohlenstoffdioxid-Vermeidungskosten können Klimaschutzmaßnahmen auf gesamtwirtschaftlicher Ebene bewertet werden