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Rauchen bei Jugendlichen - Verhaltensökonomisch basierte Maßnahmenevaluation

Research reports
Martin G. Kocher, Johannes Scherrer, Christian Bauer, Karoline Gatter, Axel Sonntag, Thomas Czypionka
Institut für Höhere Studien, Wien, 2017
Publication year: 2017

This publication is available in German only.

 

Mit der Anpassung des gesetzlichen Mindestalters für den Erwerb, Konsum und Besitz von Tabakwaren auf 18 Jahre reagiert die Gesetzgebung auf eine bedenkliche „Spitzenposition“: In
keinem Land Europas rauchen mehr Jugendliche unter 15 Jahren. Die Gesetzesänderung soll von einem umfassenden, von der ARGE Suchtvorbeugung empfohlen Paket an Präventions-
und Entwöhnungsmaßnahmen begleitet werden: Jugendliche sollen über angepasste Hotlines und eine App Unterstützung beim Rauchstopp erhalten, digitale, interaktive und
niederschwellige Kommunikation sollen die Norm des Nichtrauchens unter Jugendlichen stärken, zudem empfiehlt die ARGE ein bundesweit einheitliches Vorgehen bei
Gesetzesverstößen.

Die vorliegende Arbeit analysiert die vorgeschlagenen Maßnahmen aus verhaltensökonomischer Perspektive, unterstützt die Forderung nach einem möglichst einheitlichen Sanktionsmodell und schlägt Ansätze zur Implementierung und systematischen Evaluierung eingeführter Maßnahmen vor. Die Analyse des Rauchverhaltens auf Basis internationaler Studien in einem Framework, das Verhalten auf die wesentlichen Treiber Bereitschaft und Bewusstsein zurückführt, zeigt dabei: Weniger das Wissen über die grundlegende Schädlichkeit des Rauchens ist das Problem (Bewusstsein), als die über verschiedene verhaltenspsychologische Biases beeinflusste Bereitschaft, dieses Wissen in die Tat umzusetzen: RaucherInnen werten zukünftigen Nutzen von Nichtrauchen tendenziell stärker ab als NichtraucherInnen, haben einen ausgeprägteren Glauben, von negativen Ereignissen nicht betroffen zu sein und stehen unter großem Einfluss von Gewohnheiten und sozialen Kontextfaktoren. Die vorgeschlagenen Maßnahmen zielen hingegen weitgehend auf Kommunikation und Bewusstseinsbildung ab, können dadurch an Wirksamkeit einbüßen. Sie haben jedoch Potenzial, durch eine verhaltensökonomische Optimierung in der Ausgestaltung auch psychologische oder soziale Anreize der Bereitschaft zu adressieren. Dies gilt insbesondere für die Rauchfrei-App, die gleichsam hohen Adaptionsspielraum und ein ideales Test-Umfeld für die Evaluierung mittels Randomized Controlled Trials (RCT) bietet.

Bezüglich des Umgangs mit Verstößen ist die Forderung nach einem gemeinsamen Vorgehen der Länder aus verhaltensökonomischer Perspektive zu unterstützen. Der konkrete Vorschlag knüpft dabei an die bestehende Gesetzgebung der Länder sowie den Vorschlag eines – an die Entwicklungsstufe der Pubertät – angepassten Stufenmodells an. Ein Informations- bzw. Beratungsgespräch kann insbesondere dann Wirkung entfalten, wenn es in unmittelbarem zeitlichen Kontext des Vergehens steht und Komplementarität zu den Präventionsmaßnahmen bietet. Folgevergehen werden bislang vor allem durch die Auferlegung gemeinnütziger Arbeit und Geldbußen geahndet. Hier ist im Falle der Arbeitsleistung ratsam, eine stärkere, inhaltliche Verbindung zum Vergehen herzustellen. Geldbußen bieten indes das Potenzial, Erkenntnisse verhaltensökonomischer Forschung zum Commitment zu berücksichtigen und in optionalen

Estimating the price elasticity of fuel demand with stated preferences derived from a situational approach

Peer-reviewed journal articles
Reinhard Hössinger, Christoph Link, Axel Sonntag, Juliane Stark
Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Volume 103, Pages 154–171, doi: 10.1016/j.tra.2017.06.001
Publication year: 2017

An evidence-based policy debate about future fuel demand requires reliable estimates for fuel price elasticities. Such predictions are often based on revealed preference (RP) data. However, this procedure will only yield reliable results in the absence of severe structural discontinuities. In order to overcome this potential limitation we used a situational stated preference (SP) survey to estimate the response to hypothetical fuel price changes beyond the scope of previous observations. We elicit fuel price elasticities for price increases up to four Euros per liter and find that the situational approach predicts the actual responses to previously observed fuel price changes very well. We conclude that applying a situational approach is particularly useful, if behavioral predictions for unprecedented (non-monetary) policy interventions or supply side shocks are of interest that go beyond the reach of standard RP approaches.

Contract Choice: Efficiency and Fairness in Revenue Sharing Contracts

Peer-reviewed journal articles
Alexandros Karakostas, Axel Sonntag, Daniel John Zizzo
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 119(4), 962–986, doi: 10.1111/sjoe.12200
Publication year: 2017

We present a simple principal-agent experiment in which the principals are allowed to choose between a revenue sharing, a bonus and a trust contract, to offer to an agent. Our findings suggest that a large majority of experimental subjects choose the revenue sharing contract. This choice not only turns out to be the most efficient but at the same time is fair. Overall, the distribution of earnings is only mildly skewed towards the principal. We conclude that under revenue sharing contracts concerns for fairness can go in hand with the use of monetary incentives.

Contract Choice: Efficiency and Fairness in Revenue Sharing Contracts - online appendix

Online appendices
Alexandros Karakostas, Axel Sonntag, Daniel John Zizzo
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. Forthcoming
Publication year: 2016

Search costs and adaptive consumers: Short time delays do not affect choice quality

Peer-reviewed journal articles
Axel Sonntag
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 113. Elsevier B.V.: 64–79. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.02.024.
Publication year: 2015

Using online price comparison and shopping platforms makes experiencing slow connections, lags and waiting times for information an unfortunate reality. However, little attention has been paid to analyzing the effects of such delayed display of information on product choice behavior. This article explores the effect of time delays in a multi-attribute choice laboratory experiment by not providing information immediately when requested but after short time delays. Increasing these waiting times reduced the amount of information looked-up but did not affect choice quality. Higher time delays made decision-makers use more deliberate search processes, whereas low time delays induced inefficient oversearching.

Search costs and adaptive consumers: short time delays do not affect choice quality - online appendix

Online appendices
Axel Sonntag
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (2015), 113, 64-79
Publication year: 2015

On Reminder Effects, Drop-Outs and Dominance: Evidence from an Online Experiment on Charitable Giving

Peer-reviewed journal articles
Axel Sonntag, Daniel John Zizzo
Plos One 10 (8): e0134705. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0134705.
Publication year: 2015

We present the results of an experiment that (a) shows the usefulness of screening out drop-outs and (b) tests whether different methods of payment and reminder intervals affect charitable giving. Following a lab session, participants could make online donations to charity for a total duration of three months. Our procedure justifying the exclusion of drop-outs consists in requiring participants to collect payments in person flexibly and as known in advance and as highlighted to them later. Our interpretation is that participants who failed to collect their positive payments under these circumstances are likely not to satisfy dominance. If we restrict the sample to subjects who did not drop out, but not otherwise, reminders significantly increase the overall amount of charitable giving. We also find that weekly reminders are no more effective than monthly reminders in increasing charitable giving, and that, in our three months duration experiment, standing orders do not increase giving relative to one-off donations.

On Reminder Effects, Drop-Outs and Dominance: Evidence from an Online Experiment on Charitable Giving - online appendix

Online appendices
Axel Sonntag, Daniel John Zizzo
PLoS ONE (2015), 10 (8), e0134705
Publication year: 2015

On reminder effects, drop-outs and dominance: Evidence from an online experiment on charitable giving - dataset

Datasets
Axel Sonntag, Daniel John Zizzo
PLoS ONE (2015), 10 (8), e0134705
Publication year: 2015

We present the results of an experiment that (a) shows the usefulness of screening out drop-outs and (b) tests whether different methods of payment and reminder intervals affect charitable giving. Following a lab session, participants could make online donations to charity for a total duration of three months. Our procedure justifying the exclusion of drop-outs consists in requiring participants to collect payments in person flexibly and as known in advance and as highlighted to them later. Our interpretation is that participants who failed to collect their positive payments under these circumstances are likely not to satisfy dominance. If we restrict the sample to subjects who did not drop out, but not otherwise, reminders significantly increase the overall amount of charitable giving. We also find that weekly reminders are no more effective than monthly reminders in increasing charitable giving, and that, in our three months duration experiment, standing orders do not increase giving relative to one-off donations.

Institutional Authority and Collusion

Peer-reviewed journal articles
Axel Sonntag, Daniel John Zizzo
Sounthern Economic Journal 82 (1), 13–37, doi: 10.1002/soej.12065
Publication year: 2015

A “collusion puzzle” exists by which, even though increasing the number of firms reduces the ability to tacitly collude, and leads to a collapse in collusion in experimental markets with three or more firms, in natural markets there are such numbers of firms colluding successfully. We present an experiment showing that, if managers are deferential toward an authority, firms can induce more collusion by delegating production decisions to middle managers and providing suitable informal nudges. This holds not only with two but also with four firms. We are also able to distinguish compliance effects from coordination effects.