Publication Types:

Focality is intuitive - Experimental evidence on the effects of time pressure in coordination games

Working papers
Anders Poulsen, Axel Sonntag
Working paper available on request
Publication year: 2019

We experimentally examine the effects of varying time pressure in a coordination game with a label salient focal equilibrium. We consider both a pure coordination game (payoff symmetry) and a battle of the sexes game with conflict of interest (payoff asymmetry). In symmetric games there are no effects of time pressure, since the label-salient outcome is highly focal regardless of how much time subjects have to decide. In asymmetric games less time results in greater focality of the the label-salient action, and it becomes significantly more likely that any coordination is on the focal outcome.

Expelled from paradise - Empowering consumers to reduce corporate tax avoidance

Working papers
Enrique Fatas, Antonio Morales, Axel Sonntag
Working paper available on request
Publication year: 2018

We analyse corporate tax avoidance in a stylized experimental Bertrand setting with homogenous products and symmetric firms and consumers. More specifically, we investigate how market concentration and information disclosure of firms’ tax avoidance behaviour could reduce corporate tax avoidance. We find that making corporate tax behaviour more transparent by introducing a tax rating, makes consumers actively and costly boycott firms that do not pay their taxes. Firms anticipate consumer boycotts and increase their tax payments accordingly.