We experimentally examine the effects of varying time pressure in a coordination game with a label salient focal equilibrium. We consider both a pure coordination game (payoff symmetry) and a battle of the sexes game with conflict of interest (payoff asymmetry). In symmetric games there are no effects of time pressure, since the label-salient outcome is highly focal regardless of how much time subjects have to decide. In asymmetric games less time results in greater focality of the the label-salient action, and it becomes significantly more likely that any coordination is on the focal outcome.
We analyse corporate tax avoidance in a stylized experimental Bertrand setting with homogenous products and symmetric firms and consumers. More specifically, we investigate how market concentration and information disclosure of firms’ tax avoidance behaviour could reduce corporate tax avoidance. We find that making corporate tax behaviour more transparent by introducing a tax rating, makes consumers actively and costly boycott firms that do not pay their taxes. Firms anticipate consumer boycotts and increase their tax payments accordingly.